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BITCOIN – LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL 
FOR CYBER-LIBERTARIANS?
by
ROBERT KUTIŠ*
In the Internet pre-commercial era, much of the most influential writing about cy-
berspace was written from a cyber-libertarian perspective. But then, times and the  
Internet changed, as well as the opinions on the future of Internet regulation. Nev-
ertheless, there still are some technical developments which give libertarians hope  
that the future of the cyberspace will greatly differ from the dystopian views of it.  
Bitcoin  is  one  of  those  technical  developments  and  questions  whether  it  really  
provides anonymity for individuals, demonstrates unregulability of certain aspects  
of cyberspace or makes the regulation of cyberspace less possible in general, lie at  
the heart of this paper. After finding answers to these questions, a more general one  
can be answered – is Bitcoin really a light at the end of the tunnel for digital liber-
tarianism or just a false hope which will soon become a prey of cyber-paternalism?
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1. THE RISE AND FALL OF CYBER-LIBERTARIANISM
In the early 1990s Internet was seen as some kid of mythological space, ex-
isting outside of the physical boundaries of the “real space” providing its 
users with unprecedented freedom. But apart from freedom to pursue their 
own tastes and interests online with no or little involvement of the state, In-
ternet also offered its users the freedom of choice of the ways and extent of 
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regulation within its own digital boundaries. Under such a frame of think-
ing, pillars of the cyber-libertarianism arose. 
 The whole existence of an individual in this new disembodied space 
was based “on the primacy of the individual liberty and a commitment to plural-
ism, diversity, and community”1. Any type of state´s coercion was seen as the 
biggest threat to both political and economic freedoms of individuals within 
the new digital space and thus the approach of none, or minimal, state coer-
cion with preference for bottom-up spontaneous approach to address the 
code failures as an equivalent of the market failures2 represented the core of 
cyber-libertarian thinking. Moreover, the idea of the lack of legitimacy of 
the states existing in the physical world to regulate actions carried out in the 
Internet caused by the disappearance of the locus of the actions gave rise to 
the more radical cyber-libertarian ways of thinking. The basic idea of such 
cyber-exceptionalism could be best seen in the influential works of the mid 
1990s – A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age3 or John Perry Barlow´s De-
claration of the Independence of Cyberspace.4 
By  understanding  the  users  of  the  Internet  as  citizens  of  cyberspace, 
those works challenged the very notion of Internet governance by national 
states, working also with traditional concepts of the theory of the state – for 
example Barlow pointed to the nation-states´ lack of legitimacy to govern 
cyberspace that stems from the absence of the social contract.5 The other line 
1 Kapor, M. 1993, Where is the Digital Highway Really Going?, Wired 1(3), p. 53–59
2 See: Bator, F.M. 1958, The Anatomy of Market Failure, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 72(3) 
pp. 351–379
3 “As humankind explores this new "electronic frontier" of knowledge, it must confront again the  
most profound questions of how to organize itself for the common good. The meaning of freedom,  
structures of self-government, definition of property, nature of competition, conditions for coopera-
tion, sense of community and nature of progress will each be redefined for the Knowledge Age -- just  
as  they  were  redefined  for  a  new age of  industry  some 250 years  ago.”Dyson,  E.,  Gilder,  G., 
Keyworth, G.,Toffler,  A.  1994,  Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta  for  the  
Knowledge Age, Future Insight, Release 1.2,  August 1994. 
4  “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace,  
the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not  
welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. We have no elected government, nor  
are we likely to have one, so I address you with no greater authority than that with which liberty it -
self always speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the  
tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any meth-
ods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.[…] Cyberspace does not lie within your borders.[...]  
We are forming our own Social Contract . This governance will arise according to the conditions of  
our world, not yours.“Barlow, J. P. 1996, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Davos, 
Switzerland, February 1996
5 Kline, J. 2010,  Property and Control: Cyber-libertarianism and Public Policy in the Internet Age, 
[on-line]  http://thesis.kline.ca/documents/lit-review.pdf [Accessed:  15.11.2013]See:  Barlow, 
J. P. 1996, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Davos, Switzerland, February 1996
See also: Hobbes, T. 1651, Leviathan, Renaissance Books, Riverside, CA, U.S.A., October 2013 
Rousseau, J.J. 1968, The Social Contract, Penguin Classics, London
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of reasoning was connected with the libertarian notion that the intrinsic role 
of the state is to protect its citizens from physical harm6 and since such harm 
is not possible in the cyberspace, there is no need for government protec-
tion. Thus, cyber-exceptionalists had seen the Internet as a space with its 
own culture and social norms, which as a whole stay outside the jurisdic-
tion of the nation-states. 
Such insight also inherently brings into the light the questions of Internet 
governance and regulation of the actions which take place in this independ-
ent (cyber)space. The original cyber-libertarian stance was set by Johnson´s 
and Post´s vision of post-national state of being, where traditional, on the 
states´ sovereignty based, regulatory systems simply cannot be used for cy-
berspace regulation and governance.7 Instead, self-regulation,  where con-
sensus of the “citizens” of the cyberspace plays the main role should pre-
vail8, or as later Murray put it – any regulator within cyberspace will act 
only as agents of individual or group interests.9 
With regard to the character of the Internet and the climate embracing its 
functioning in most of the 1990s, the cyber-libertarian rhetoric predomin-
ated and the freedom, liberty and self-regulation became the holy trinity10 of 
much of the influential works in those days.11 However, further commer-
cionalisation of the cyberspace and changes in the possibilities of the Inter-
net  regulation caused that  cyber-libertarian  way of thinking became less 
prevalent in the literature, or at least many authors changed their rhetoric. 12 
As Dahlberg aptly wrote “[b]y the beginning of the new millennium, the Inter-
6 See: Rand, A. 1981. The Virtue of Selfishness, New American Library, New York, p. 109 
7 See: Johnson, D. R, Post, D. G. 1996, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan-
ford Law Review, p. 1367 
8 Id at p.1391
9 See: Murray, A.  2002, Free Expression and Censorship Through Design Protocols: A Misap-
plication of the ICANN UDRP, 17th Bileta Annual Conference, p.9 [on-line]http://www.bi-
leta.ac.uk/content/files/conference%20papers/2002/Free%20Expression%20and%20Censor-
ship%20Through%20Design%20Protocols%20-%20A%20Misapplication%20of%20the
%20ICANN%20UDRP.pdf,  [Accessed: 29.11.2013]
See also:  Klang, M. 2005, Controlling Online Information: Censorship & Cultural Protection, A 
presentation given at “WSIS, Internet Governance and Human Rights” Uppsala, October 3,  
2005,  [on-line]  http://www.kus.uu.se/pdf/publications/ICT/klang_03_oct.pdf  [Accessed: 
09.11.2013]
10 See:  Boyle,J.  1997,  Foucault  in  Cyberspace:  Surveillance,  Sovereignty,  and Hardwired  Censors, 
University of Cincinnati Law Review Vol. 66, pp. 177–79, p. 177  
11 However that does not mean that such insights were without a critique. See: Aoki, K. 1998, 
Considering Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties:  Liberalism, Libertarianism, National Sover-
eignty, “Global” Intellectual Property, and the Internet, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
Vol. 5, Issue 2, pp. 443-4473 
See  also:  Reidenberg,  J.  1998,  Lex  Informatica:  The  Formation  of  Information  Policy  Rules  
Through Technology, Texas Law Review Vol. 76. Number 3, pp. 553-594 
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net was generally seen as part and parcel of “everyday life” – simply an extension  
of existing social systems, rather than being a revolutionary medium transcending  
offline political and economic constraints.”13
Such continuous change in the nature of the Internet proved that many 
sceptical  views on the Internet future unveiled the weaknesses of the cy-
ber-libertarian  optimistic  reasoning  with  great  accuracy.  Goldsmith  ob-
served very soon that cyber-libertarians overstated the Internet and territ-
ory separateness, not recognizing that the question of Internet controllabil-
ity is not about the mere possibility, but rather about its cost.14  
Later, Lessig came up with the position that most of the features that 
portray the Internet as a space which is inherently unregulable are not stem-
ming from some inherent libertarian nature of the Internet as cyber-liber-
tarians tend to see it, but they are purely coding choices – and those can be 
rather easily changed.15 Although this position may not seem so disastrous 
for the cyber-libertarians on the first sight since it means that cyber-libertari-
an  values  can  also  be  promoted  by  means  of  the  code,  Lessig  rightly 
foresaw that the biggest threat for the future of the cyberspace from the cy-
ber-libertarian perspective  lies  at  the hands of private entities  with their 
own commercial  or  political  interests.  Arguing  that  “[t]he  invisible  hand,  
through commerce, is constructing an architecture that perfects control—an archi-
tecture  that  makes possible highly efficient regulation”16 Lessig point  out that 
those entities, offered with powerful control have only little motivation to 
protect fundamental cyber-libertarian values.17
12 For instance, Barlow changed his rather courageous rhetoric from the Declaration of the In-
dependence of Cyberspace to more cautious statements – for example when later claimed 
that at least the some of his ideas expressed in the declaration were right because „ the Inter-
net continues to be an anti-sovereign social space, endowing billions with capacities for free expres-
sion“. Dahlberg, L. 2010,  Cyber-libertarianism 2.0: A discourse theory/critical political economy  
examination, Cultural Politics Vol. 6, Issue 3, pp. 331-356, p. 333
13 Dahlberg, L. 2010, Cyber-libertarianism 2.0: A discourse theory/critical political economy examina-
tion, Cultural Politics Vol. 6, Issue 3, pp. 331-356, p.333See also: Margolis, M., Resnick, D.  
2000, Politics as Usual: The Cyberspace“Revolution”, Sage, London
14 Goldsmith, J. L. 1998, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, Indi-
ana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol.5, Issue 2, pp. 475-491 
15 Lessig,L. 1999,  Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Basic Books, New York, p.217 See also: 
Holland, B. 2007, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities of Modi-
fied Exceptionalism, Kansas Law Review Vol 56, pp. 101-137, p. 113
16 Lessig,L. 1999, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Basic Books, New York, p.6
17 See also: Holland, B. 2007, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communit-
ies of Modified Exceptionalism, Kansas Law Review Vol 56, pp. 101-137, p. 114
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2. GLIMMERS OF HOPE FOR CYBER-LIBERTARIANS
After some time passed, it could now be said that Lessig and many other 
authors who were rather sceptical about the cyber-libertarian views on the 
future of the Internet were right in a number of things. Put very simply, de-
velopment of the character of the Internet in the last two decades too closely 
resembles the content of the thesis of Debra Spar that society’s reaction to 
new technologies follows a predictable sequence of stages starting with the 
innovation, followed by chaos and creative anarchy, self-regulation, com-
mercial  exploitation,  piracy,  attempts to monopolize the field and finally 
with government rules and control.18 However, apart from rules imposed 
by terrestrial sovereigns, market forces foresaw by Lessig play also big role 
in today´s Internet nature. Thus, ironically, most of the norms and values 
associated with today´s Internet are emerging from the field of commercial 
entities and now and then even cyber-libertarians call  for intervention of 
sovereign  governments  in  order  to  protect  individuals  acting  in  cyber-
space.19
Nevertheless, there still is a number of glimmers of hope for cyber-liber-
tarians  including  cyber-exceptionalists  that  encourages many to say “cy-
ber-libertarianism´s  not  dead”20 -  one  might  see  them  in  the  end-to-end 
design of the Internet architecture,21 free software, cryptography,22 mere op-
portunity for anonymity,23 technologies that enhance anonymity,24 or emer-
ging e-currencies with Bitcoin on the forefront.  Building upon the previ-
18 Spar, D.L. 2001, Ruling the Waves: Cycles of Discovery, Chaos, and Wealth from the Compass to  
the Internet, Harcourt Trade Publishers, Sand Diego, CASee also: MacCarthy, M. Internet Ex-
ceptionalism Revisited In. Marcus, A., Szoka, B. (eds.) 2010, The Next Digital Decade: Essays on  
the Future of the Internet, pp. 209 -237, p. 210, Techfreedom, Washington, D.C.
19 The debate over online privacy and data protection is a good example. 
20 Although cyber-libertarian thinking in form of cyber-exceptionalism is no more the topic of 
the day, cyber-libertarianism is still quite widely held belief shaping many debates over In-
ternet regulation. See: Holland, B.  Section 230 of the CDA: Internet Exceptionalism as a Stat-
utory Construct  In. Marcus, A., Szoka, B. (eds.) 2010,  The Next Digital Decade: Essays on the  
Future of the Internet, pp. 189-209 - an adapted version of Holland, B. 2007, In Defense of On-
line Intermediary Immunity:  Facilitating Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, Kansas Law 
Review Vol 56, pp. 101-137 
21 See: Lessig, L. 2002, The Architecture of Innovation,  Duke Law Journal Vol. 51, pp. 1783-1801, 
p. 1789 See als:   Holland, B. 2007,  In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating  
Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, Kansas Law Review Vol 56, pp. 101-137, p. 114
22 More specifically - wide use of strong cryptography as an ideal response to today´s prob-
lems of Internet as it is seen by „cypherpunks“.See: Applelbaum, J., Assange, J., Müller-
Maguhn, A., Zimmermann, J., 2012, Cypherpunks, Freedom and the Future of the Internet , OR 
Books, London
23 See: Reidenberg, J. 1998,  Lex Informatica: The Formation of Information Policy Rules Through  
Technology,  Texas Law Review Vol.  76. Number 3, pp. 553-594See also: Strasser,M. 2001, 
Beyond Napster: How the Law Might Respond to a Changing Internet Architecture, Northern Ken-
tucky Law Review, Number 28, p. 760–712 
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ously used  analogy with the music genre – the only question now stands 
whether any of those bearers of hope for cyber-libertarians will hit the right 
“tune” to bring cyber-libertarianism, or even cyber-exceptionalism back on 
the  main  scene.  With  regard to maybe even unexpected success,  Bitcoin 
seems capable of doing exactly that.
3. BITCOIN
Bitcoin can be described as a decentralized electronic currency scheme and 
at  the  same time  as  quickly  emerging  electronic  payment  system,  intro-
duced  by  a  rather  mystical,  or  better  said  pseudonymous25 Satoshi  Na-
kamoto in 200826 and deployed in the beginning of the year 2009. The main 
rationale of Bitcoin launch was Nakamoto´s belief that electronic payment 
system based not on trust in financial institutions acting as intermediaries,  
but cryptography, allowing to carry out transactions directly between two 
parties without the need for a trusted third party, is needed.27 Such system 
design offers users the electronic currency which can be used for electronic 
payments  which  are  performed faster  and cheaper  than with  traditional 
trust based payment methods.
 Apart from cryptography, Bitcoin is based also on the peer-to-peer net-
work and the proof-of-work system.28 While the former mainly relates to the 
way how are Bitcoin transactions carried out, the latter relates also to the 
way how bitcoins are “minted”. Since Bitcoin, as a digital currency, can be 
briefly described as a chain of digital signatures, the transaction represent 
the process where owner of the Bitcoin, using secret key corresponding to 
his public key, digitally signs a hash of the previous transactions and the 
public key of the next owner which is then added to the end of the electron-
ic coin itself – thus creating the above mentioned chain.29 Since such design 
24 For example the Tor Project, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en [Accessed: 
07.01.2014]
25 I reffer to Satoshi Nakamoto as “pseudonymous“, because his real identity was never truly 
unveiled. 
26 See: Nakamoto, S. 2008,  Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, http://bitcoin.org/bit-
coin.pdf [Accessed: 27.10.2013]
27 Id at p.1
28 More specifically, Hashcash is (with minor changes) the proof-of-work system used by Bit -
coin.For  more about  Hashcash  see:  Back,  A.  2002,  Hashcash  -  A  Denial  of  Service  Coun-
ter-Measure, http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf [Accessed: 02.11.2013]
29 Meiklejohn, S., et al. 2013, A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with No  
Names,  http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~smeiklejohn/files/imc13.pdf,  [Accessed:  16.11.2013], 
p.2Nakamoto,  S.  2008,  Bitcoin:  A Peer-to-Peer  Electronic  Cash System,  http://bitcoin.org/bit-
coin.pdf [Accessed: 27.10.2013], p.2
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does not in itself prevent double spending of the Bitcoins, creator(s)30 de-
cided for a solution based on timestamps.31 Transactions are thus grouped 
into blocks in which they are timestamped. Those blocks are then formed 
into a block chain which is then publicly available.32 This is the point where 
not only proof-of-work system modified by Bitcoin come into use,33 but also 
when the process of  the Bitcoin “minting” is  introduced  because,  using 
very simplified explanation, Bitcoin is “minted” during the process of form-
ing a block. Since all tasks needed to be performed during the process of 
Bitcoin transaction are carried out by number of participants, the incentive 
to support the network lies right in the convention that the first transaction 
in a block starts a new coin owned by the creator of the block.34
With regard to above mentioned description of cornerstones of Bitcoin 
functioning, Bitcoin can be viewed as a virtual currency scheme and digital 
payment system based on a peer-to peer network which does not have a 
central clearing house, nor central authority in charge of money supply, op-
erating without any involvement of financial institutions acting as trusted 
third parties in the transactions, since users perform all these tasks them-
selves.35 
4. CYBER-LIBERTARIANISM, BITCOIN AND THE FUTURE OF 
BOTH
Reading the lines above, many characteristics of Bitcoin must have pleased 
the heart of every cyber-libertarian, however two are of particular import-
ance – its decentralised nature and the promise of anonymity. 
4.1 ANONYMITY
Generally speaking, anonymity is not a good in itself.  One may use his an-
onymity as he wishes – to exercise the freedom of expression in the fight 
against  totalitarian regimes,  support and promote human rights by other 
means, purchase weapons, or to sell drugs. Nevertheless, anonymity is in-
herently good for protecting and strengthening one´s sphere of freedom, 
30 See supra note 26.
31 In order to avoid involving trusted third party. 
32 See: Nakamoto, S. 2008,  Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, http://bitcoin.org/bit-
coin.pdf [Accessed: 27.10.2013], p. 2
33 Id at p. 3-4
34 See: Id at, p.3
35 See: ECB, 2012,  Virtual Currency Schemes, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtual-
currencysche mes201210en.pdf  [Accessed: 03.11.2013], p.6
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which puts it naturally into the position of a good from the cyber-libertarian 
or, even more so, from the crypto-anarchistic perspective.36 Since anonymity 
in business transactions promised by Bitcoin facilitates fulfilment of the eco-
nomic and other freedoms, from the point of cyber-libertarianism, anonym-
ity represents a characteristic of particular significance.
Despite the fact that Bitcoin is often referred to as “digital cash”37 there is 
number of substantial  differences  between them – for example,  the “real 
world cash” does not allow one to see all previous transactions done with 
particular bill or coin, as Bitcoin does. Thus, one´s ownership of Bitcoins is 
genuinely anonymous only until he decides to cash out or spend them. This 
feature of Bitcoin is connected to design choice, where creator(s), in order to 
leave out intermediaries in form of various financial institutions, decided to 
use system where payee is aware of all transactions of the coin. Thus, in or-
der  to  prevent  double  spending,  all  transactions  must  be  publicly  an-
nounced38 to global peer-to-peer network of participants who are verifying 
them. Aware of such trait, one may easily come to conclusion that Bitcoin is 
not as completely anonymous as it may seem on the first sight. Then, it is  
only up to computer scientists to confirm such notion - as they very recently 
did.
Results  of  research  made  by  researchers  from ETH  Zurich  and NEC 
Laboratories Europe - who mimicked the use of Bitcoin in university envir-
onment on a simulator - show that the profiles of almost 40% of the users 
can be, to a large extent, recovered even when users adopt privacy meas-
ures recommended by Bitcoin.39 Also second research, done very recently 
by researchers from University of California and George Mason University 
came to similar conclusions - researchers noticed growing gap between the 
potential anonymity offered by the Bitcoin protocol design and the actual 
anonymity achieved by users.40 Moreover, after tracking the thief who stole 
Bitcoins from other individual users using trojan they stated that “even the  
36 Crypto-anarchism is a branch of cyber-anarchism. Put very simply,  cypto-anarchists em-
ploy robust cryptographic software in order to oppose to the regulatory efforts of not only 
states, but also private entities. 
37 Brito, J., Castillo, A. 2013, Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers, Mercatus Center at George Ma-
son  University,  http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Brito_BitcoinPrimer_embargoed.pdf 
[Accessed: 11.01.2014]
38 Nakamoto, S. 2008, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.p-
df [Accessed: 27.10.2013], p.2
39 Androulaki, E., et al., 2013,  Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Vol. 7859, pp. 34-51
40 Meiklejohn, S. et al. 2013,  A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with No  
Names, http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~smeiklejohn/files/imc13.pdf, [Accessed: 16.11.2013],p. 12-13
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most motivated Bitcoin users (i.e., criminals) are engaging in idioms of use that al-
low us to erode their anonymity”.41 After using clustering heuristic allowing 
them to cluster addresses belonging to the same user which is however not 
really fully robust they argue that among average users this gap is  more 
likely to widen: “[w]e argue that to completely thwart our heuristics would re-
quire a significant effort on the part of the user, and that this loss of usability is un-
likely to appeal to all but the most motivated users (such as criminals)”.42 
4.2 DECENTRALISED NATURE
As stated above, the cornerstones of Bitcoin functioning are based on a peer-
to-peer network by means of which, without any involvement of a central 
clearing house or financial institutions acting as trusted third parties, users 
perform all of the necessary tasks by themselves. Bitcoins are minted and 
transactions are verified by users who are, aided by the software, de facto 
exchanging their CPU power and energy for a share of newly minted Bit-
coins.43 Such design provides sufficient incentives not only to support the 
functioning of Bitcoin, but also an incentive to stay „honest“ within this sys-
tem. The idea is that even if a person is able to assemble more CPU power 
than all the „honest“ users, „he ought to find it more profitable to play by the  
rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than everyone else combined,  
than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.“44
However, such constructed and maintained character of the Bitcoin is 
not necessarily permanent. Incentive for centralisation may stem from the 
ambitions of subjects other than users seeking to maximize their profits – 
for example sovereign states.45 Furthermore, “greedy” users do not neces-
sarily behave according to the pattern presumed by the creators of Bitcoin – 
this  is  true all  the more when other practices than “honest” use of CPU 
power  can  achieve  much  higher  revenues  than those  offered by  Bitcoin 
scheme.  
41 Id at p. 12
42 Id at p. 13
43 With regard to above mentioned users who with the help of the software verify Bitcoin  
transactions are called miners. Nakamoto, S. 2008, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash Sys-
tem, http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [Accessed: 27.10.2013], s. 4
44 Nakamoto, S. 2008, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.p-
df [Accessed: 27.10.2013], p. 4
45 Such incentive may stem for example from the need to stabilize own “real-world” currency 
to the detriment of electronic currencies.
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This was very recently confirmed by the results of research focused on 
the decentralised nature of Bitcoin, published by the Department of Com-
puter Science at the Cornell University. Their conclusions suggest that the 
creator(s) of the Bitcoin overstated the power of incentives offered to users 
by Bitcoin design to stay “honest”46 since they found out that the Bitcoin 
ecosystem is facing the challenge of potential takeover and manipulation by 
miners who seek to maximize their rewards.47 The paper presented a Bitcoin 
mining strategy that  enables  pools of  colluding  miners  to  earn revenues 
higher than their fair share, what can lead new miners to join the “selfish” 
miners with possible catastrophic outcomes for decentralized currency since 
the colluding group will increase in size until it becomes a majority – and in 
that point “the Bitcoin system ceases to be a decentralized currency”.48
5. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the answer to the ques-
tion whether Bitcoin truly represent such technological  innovation that is 
able to bring the cyber-libertarian, or even cyber-exceptionalist views on the 
future of Internet regulation back on the track of the mainstream public de-
bate. 
Despite noticeable shift in the Internet governance, Bitcoin proved that 
even today one may - pushing the notion of decentralisation to a new level - 
create something that functions within the scope of today´s setting of the In-
ternet and nevertheless seem unregulable again. Combining this character-
istic with the promise of anonymity49 that is provided, Bitcoin is empower-
ing individuals acting on the Internet to really materialize their economical  
freedoms and together with those also political and other freedoms.50
Nevertheless, I do not believe that Bitcoin is a dream come true for cy-
ber-libertarians - mainly because neither of those two core characteristics 
can be understood as permanent and their sustainability for the future is 
more than uncertain. Even though it can be argued that Bitcoin represents 
46 Nakamoto, S. 2008, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.p-
df [Accessed: 27.10.2013], p.4
47 Eyal, I., Sirer, G. E., 2013, Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable, arXiv:1311.0243 
[cs.CR], http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243 [Acccessed: 02.11.2013], p.15
48 Id at p. 1, 2 and 12
49 Fuelling  the functioning of  various  services,  repressed movements etc.  financing whose 
seemed before almost unimaginable. (not only recently closed SilkRoad, but also Wikileaks, 
revolutionary movements in some countries etc.)
50 Since political and other freedoms are extremely intertwined with economical freedoms of 
contract and exchange.
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the code which - promoting cyber-libertarian values – does not tend to be 
changed, its own design contains several weak points which may prove cru-
cial  in connection to future regulatory efforts.  The promise of anonymity 
that is so appealing for cyber-libertarians is not adhered in the everyday use 
and the future of this promise is thus looking rather gloomy. Also the de-
centralised  nature  of  Bitcoin  faces  many  future  challenges  –  potential 
takeover  and manipulation  with  the  system by the  majority  of  “selfish” 
miners represent only the main one. Bearing in mind latest fragments added 
to the mosaic of potential future regulation of Bitcoin51 I am rather sceptical 
about the outlook of this nevertheless genius technological solution – pred-
ators  from the  ranks of  cyber-paternalists  are  surrounding  the  prey and 
odds are on their side.   
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